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Abstract 
A long-term hydrogen-based scenario of the global energy system is described in qualitative and quantitative terms here, 
illustrating the key role of hydrogen in a long-term transition toward a clean and sustainable energy future. In an affluent, 
low-population-growth, equity and sustainability-oriented B l-H2 world, hydrogen technologies experience substantial but 
plausible performance and costs improvements and are able to diffuse extensively. Corresponding production and distribution 
infrastructures emerge. The global hydrogen production system, initially fossil based, progressively shifts toward renewable 
sources. Fuel cells and other hydrogen-using technologies play a major role in a substantial transformation toward a more 
flexible, less vulnerable, distributed energy system which meets energy needs in a cleaner, more efficient and cost-effective 
way. This profound structural transformation of the global energy system brings substantial improvements in energy intensity 
and security of supply and results in an accelerated decarbonization of the energy mix, with subsequent relatively low climate 
impacts. Such energy-system path might still not be sufficient to protect against the risk of high climate sensitivities, but 
hydrogen-based technologies emerge as flexible options for the energy system and, thus, would be prime candidates for a risk 
management strategy against an uncertain climate future. 
© 2002 International Association for Hydrogen Energy. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of sustainable development has evolved into 
a guiding principle for a livable future world where human 
needs are met while keeping the balance with nature. Ad-
dressing the challenge of sustainability requires a long-term 
perspective and the integration of many elements. Energy 
is one of them. Driving the global energy system into a 
sustainable path is progressively becoming a major concern 
and policy objective [1,2]. The emergence of a sustainable 
global energy system, however, is a gradual long-term pro-
cess that will require a profound transformation of its cur-
rent structure. 
• Corresponding author. Tel.: +43-2236-807578; fax: +43-
2236-71313. 
E-mail address: barreto@iiasa.ac.at (L. Barreto). 
Although many alternative sustainable energy pathways 
may emerge, the so-called "hydrogen economy" has re-
ceived particular attention. A hydrogen-based energy sys-
tem is regarded as a viable and advantageous option for 
delivering high-quality energy services in a wide range of 
applications in an efficient, clean and safe manner while 
meeting sustainability goals [3]. Hydrogen also provides an 
ideal complement to electricity. Both are premium quality 
energy carriers, do not contain carbon and generate little 
or no polluting emissions at the point of use. Electricity, 
however, is at disadvantage when storage is required while 
hydrogen could be well suited for those applications. 
Its versatility is enhanced by the fact that it can be 
produced from a variety of fossil and non-fossil primary 
resources. Thus, supply infrastructures can be developed 
according to the feedstocks available in different regions. 
This can bring concrete energy security benefits and could 
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facilitate the transition to a sustainable energy system. In 
the initial phase of a "hydrogen economy", hydrogen could 
be produced from the current competitive fossil fuels. At 
a later stage, the production system could evolve toward 
renewable resources. 
In such way, it would become an ideal vehicle to "add value" 
to renewable resources and make them suitable to provide 
high-quality energy services (4]. At the same time, making 
hydrogen out of renewable sources would drive its production 
system toward a sustainable trajectory in the long term. 
Hydrogen has also a strategic importance in the pursuit 
of a low-emission, environment-benign, cleaner and more 
sustainable energy system. On the one hand, the introduc-
tion of highly efficient and clean hydrogen-based end-use 
technologies would help to reduce final energy consumption 
and, in addition, could provide local and regional environ-
mental benefits (e.g. regarding air pollution). On the other 
hand, hydrogen can be produced from carbon-free resources 
or from fossil fuels combined with carbon separation and 
sequestration. Thus, hydrogen could contribute substantially 
to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
In the distant future, hydrogen could become an impor-
tant energy commodity at the global level. Achieving such a 
goal, however, will require significant cost and performance 
improvements in production, storage, conversion, trans-
portation and end-use technologies . Only a sound combina-
tion of research, development and demonstration efforts, as 
well as commercial deployment would lead to the necessary 
technology improvements and cost reductions [5]. Intensive 
R&D efforts are still required in a number of areas [6]. In 
addition, the profitable commercialization of hydrogen 
technologies will require market strategies that stimulate the 
coordination of different market segments. 
Niche markets, for example, where convenience, reliabil-
ity, and environmental criteria are important, could make 
hydrogen technologies attractive, and are most likely to play 
a critical role in their diffusion. Fuel cells, for instance, 
already find acceptance in applications where their clean-
liness, reliability and fuel flexibility compensate for their 
higher costs, for example supplying electricity to sensitive 
loads with stringent reliability-of-supply standards. 
Distributed stationary co-generation (joint production of 
power and heat) applications in buildings and industry, to-
gether with selected mobile transportation applications (e.g. 
public and private vehicle fleets) could be the key to stimu-
late the initial growth of the hydrogen market. Potential syn-
ergies between the buildings and vehicles markets could be 
used to make hydrogen a more attractive alternative and help 
to overcome the initial infrastructure barrier [7] . Specifically, 
hydrogen production appliances installed to serve buildings 
needs could also be used as refueling sources for vehicles. 
Fuel cell powered vehicles, in turn, could be a source of 
electricity while parked. A dynamic growth in these niche 
markets would justify the deployment of large-scale pro-
duction and transportation facilities later on, when demand 
increases and becomes more geographically dense. 
A number of studies have analyzed the perspectives and 
possible strategies for a transition toward a hydrogen-based 
energy system, the so-called "hydrogen economy" (e.g. 
(3,7-10]. Structural changes of energy systems, however, 
take a long time. A transition from niche markets to a fully 
developed "hydrogen economy" would span over many 
decades. Thus, adequate quantifications of long-term trends 
and structural changes in the global energy system compat-
ible with the successful diffusion of hydrogen technologies 
are required. 
This very long-term perspective is adopted here in 
order to explore the role of hydrogen technologies in a 
future scenario of energy, economic and environmental 
development. Our "hydrogen-economy" scenario is based 
upon the IIASA-SRES Bl [II] scenario with updated in-
formation on hydrogen technology characteristics gathered 
from a technology assessment. 
The scenario (labeled Bl-H2) portrays a world with high 
environmental and social consciousness combined with 
globally coordinated efforts to achieve sustainable devel-
opment and to reduce income disparities across regions. 
Population growth is restrained while economic growth is 
vigorous. Technological change plays an important role and 
diffusion of clean technologies is fast. Given these charac-
teristics, a B l-H2 world is a fertile ground to nurture an 
emerging sustainable "hydrogen economy". 
The Bl-H2 world outlines hydrogen's potential contribu-
tion to the global energy mix in the 21st century if favorable 
conditions for its penetration were in place. Clearly, from 
today's perspective, substantial hurdles still have to be sur-
mounted. Thus, it may be regarded as an optimistic, although 
insightful, perspective. In Bl-H2, provided there were sig-
nificant but plausible technology enhancements, hydrogen 
becomes the main final-energy carrier by the end of the 2 lst 
century and a diversified and sustainable portfolio of pro-
duction and end-use technologies emerges and develops. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
narrative "storyline" that qualitatively delineates the main 
characteristics of our hydrogen-based energy future. Our 
quantification of the hydrogen economy consistent with the 
scenario "storyline" is presented in Section 3. Model and 
scenario assumptions are described and results from the sce-
nario analysis are discussed. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
Appendix A presents a list of the aggregated electricity gen-
eration technologies included in our analysis. 
2. The storyline of a future running on hydrogen 
This section presents the scenario storyline based on 
which we have adopted a set of internally consistent 
assumptions to calculate the scenario quantification pre-
sented in Section. 3. The storyline represents a description 
of how a future consistent with the hydrogen economy 
might unfold, and gives a brief characterization of its main 
driving forces. First, we present some qualitative descrip-
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tion illustrating the economic, technical, environmental and 
social developments in the scenario. Finally, we will focus 
on the role of hydrogen and summarize the main features 
for the hydrogen deployment and its eventual success. 
As explained above, the scenario developed here builds 
upon the IIASA-SRES-Bl quantification (11] with an 
updated set of hydrogen technologies characteristics. In view 
of that, we have chosen to label it the Bl-H2 scenario. As 
mentioned before, we will use the context of the Bl-H2 sce-
nario to explore a possible "ceiling" for the contribution of 
hydrogen to the energy system under favorable conditions. 
The B l-H2 world follows a sustainable-development 
path, where environmental concerns at local, regional and 
global levels remain high in the policy agenda; priority is 
given by governments and economic actors to the develop-
ment and diffusion of clean, highly efficient technologies. 
The evolution of a collective environmental consciousness 
drives to strengthen the local participation in planning and 
decision-making, and to the emergence of sustainable com-
munities, eager and able to make their own nature-benign 
choices. This gives a substantial impulse to versatile, 
decentralized, less vulnerable, highly efficient and 
environmentally compatible energy technologies. In these 
circumstances, a global hydrogen-based energy system 
emerges as a sensible alternative to contribute to the 
achievement of long-term energy sustainability goals. 
Hydrogen technologies are intensively developed and their 
introduction to the market actively pursued. 
Social actors at many different levels embrace the prin-
ciples of sustainability and pay increased attention to so-
cial and environmental aspects of development. Improved 
efficiency of resource use (i.e. "dematerialization"), equity, 
development of social institutions and environmental pro-
tection become actively pursued goals. Steadily rising ed-
ucation levels result in a transition toward a high-skilled 
labor force and a better integration of women in the labor 
markets. Development takes place with a strong emphasis 
on promoting, and productively using, social capital [12], 
as well-functioning social networks, institutions, associated 
norms and (shared) values are progressively seen as an 
essential pre-condition for economic prosperity and sustain-
ability. 
Technology is acknowledged as an essential instrument 
to achieve sustainability and energy security goals and, thus, 
technological change plays an important role. Public-private 
alliances together with international collaboration and 
coordinated technology policies help to share the costs and 
overcome the risks of developing innovative technologies. 
As a result, significant levels of technology spillover occur. 
Promotion of international RD3 partnerships 1 and intro-
duction of incentive-based mechanisms allow development 
1 RD3 is an acronym for research, development, demonstration 
and deployment [5]. It refers to strategies that recognize the impor-
tance of combining "technology push" with "demand pull" mech-
anisms to promote the diffusion of emerging technologies. 
and fast diffusion of cleaner and more efficient technologies. 
Co-operation schemes permit local capacity building and 
successful technology transfer toward developing regions. 
The combination of technical and organizational change 
results in high levels of material and energy saving, reduc-
tions in pollution and improvements in labor productivity. 
Together with significant energy efficiency improvements, 
this translates into a relatively small increase in energy de-
mands. Environmental quality is high, as potentially nega-
tive effects are dealt with in an effective manner. Although 
explicit climate policies are not in place, the combination 
of proactive environmental measures at the local, regional 
and international levels results in the rapid introduction of 
hydrogen technologies and, consequently, relatively low car-
bon emissions. 
In the distant future, hydrogen will have become the pre-
ferred energy carrier for a number of applications, provid-
ing a suitable complement to electricity in delivering energy 
services in a clean and cost-effective way. Hz-powered appli-
ances will have spread through residential complexes, trans-
portation technologies and industrial applications supported 
by a well-developed infrastructure of production, transporta-
tion, storage and distribution. 
Other developments have accompanied and encouraged 
their diffusion. Specifically, stimulated by the shift toward 
open and competitive markets, the electricity system expe-
rienced an institutional and regulatory revolution to accom-
modate the emerging, increasingly competitive small-scale 
decentralized generation alternatives. A distributed system 
has emerged that ensures the high reliability and power qual-
ity standards the knowledge-oriented digital society requires 
and that adequately responds to energy security issues. Flex-
ible and inexpensive automation, metering and communica-
tion technologies allow easily redirecting power flows, as 
disperse generation sources go in and out of the network. 
Fuel cells and related technologies are well developed, 
mature and have become ubiquitous. Hand-held comput-
ing and communication devices are powered by miniature, 
circuit-like and easily "rechargeable" fuel cells (using for 
instance a hydride cartridge). Ultra-light, very efficient and 
low-polluting cars powered by inexpensive low-temperature 
fuel cells circulate in the streets and also operate as small 
distributed electricity generators, injecting electricity to the 
grid while parked. 
A significant share of electricity generation will be based 
on these vehicular fuel cells. The load factor of a car is 
3-6 percent which means that the car is parked 94-97 
percent of its life time-usually close to where the drivers 
stay anyway: at home, work or in a restaurant. These 
car-driver locations are precisely where the demand loads 
arise. Current global automotive generating capacity is ap-
proximately one order of magnitude larger than total utility 
and non-utility electricity generating capacity. Thus, spare 
and reserve capacity would not be a constraint. Where con-
venient, hydrogen micro-turbines and high-temperature fuel 
cells will cover the heating and electricity needs of larger 
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commercial and industrial complexes, which are allowed to 
trade their power surpluses in the spot market. 
3. A hydrogen scenario---quantification and results 
The B l-H2 scenario portrayed here builds upon the sto-
ryline given in Section 2 and the long-term IIASA-Bl sce-
nario described and quantified in [ 11]. For the quantification 
of the Bl-H2 scenario, we used GDP, population, technol-
ogy characteristics and resource availability consistent with 
the SRES-Bl scenario, and updated all relevant information 
for hydrogen technologies according to a technology assess-
ment briefly described in Section 3.2. We will first describe 
the main characteristics of these driving forces, whose inter-
action plays a significant role in shaping the path followed 
in the B l-H2 world, and then proceed to highlight selected 
results on the emerging structure of the global energy sys-
tem and its environmental impacts. 
The analysis has been carried out with MESSAGE, a 
systems-engineering optimization model with a detailed 
technological representation, and MACRO, a top-down styl-
ized macro-economic model [13). In MESSAGE-MACRO, 
the global energy system is disaggregated in 11 regions. 
For simplicity, however, the discussion here is carried out 
mainly at the global level and, where appropriate, for the 
following four aggregate regions: 
• The OECD90 region groups the countries belonging to 
the OECD in 1990. 
• The REF region brings together the economies-in-transition 
in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
• The ASIA region represents the developing countries in 
the Asian continent. 
• The ALM region covers the rest of the world, grouping 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the 
Middle East. 
3.1. Demographic and economic assumptions 
The population trajectory underlying this scenario cor-
responds to a variant of the low-population projection re-
ported by Lutz [14), where low-fertility and low-mortality 
assumptions are combined with central interregional migra-
tion trends. Extensive aging occurs in all regions and global 
population peaks at 8.7 billion in 2050 and declines after-
wards reaching 7 .1 billion by the end of the 21st century 
(5.6 billion in developing countries and 1.4 billion in in-
dustrialized ones). This scenario is consistent with recent 
analyses, which have found a significant probability that the 
world population will stop growing well before the end of 
the century [15]. 
Closely linked to this demographic trend, economic de-
velopment is balanced and vigorous and deliberate efforts 
to reduce interregional income inequalities prove effective. 
With a significant economic "catch up" in the develop-
ing regions, the gap in per capita income between them 
and the industrialized regions narrows. A gross world prod-
uct (GWP) of around US$329trillion (1990US$ at market 
exchange rates) is reached by 2100, which presupposes an 
optimistic global average growth rate of 2.5 percent per 
annum. This substantial growth is fueled, among other fac-
tors, by technological and organizational changes that result 
in large labor productivity increases. 
A distinctive feature of this scenario is that economic 
development emphasizes social and environmental issues. 
Governments and businesses support and engage themselves 
in activities to boost eco-effi.ciency and social well-being. In 
this world, a large part of the gains are invested in improving 
resource efficiency, achieving social objectives within and 
between countries, strengthening social institutions, build-
ing collaborative networks and ensuring environmental pro-
tection. 
Income per capita also rises at a fast pace reaching an 
average global value ofUS$15,600 in 2050 and US$46,600 
in 2100 ( l 990US$ at market exchange rates), being a sig-
nificant fraction spent in services rather than material goods. 
This is a fast-converging world. By the end of the cen-
tury, the average income per capita in the developing world 
reaches US$40,600 or 59 percent of that of the industrial-
ized ones (US$69,300). 
3.2. Technological change 
Technological change is among the main drivers of 
long-term productivity and economic growth [16). Over 
long time horizons, performance of technologies is consid-
erably improved (efficiencies increased, unit costs reduced, 
etc.) and new technologies are introduced. Characteristic 
for technological learning is that costs typically decrease 
in line with accumulation of experience (measured as a 
function of cumulative output). 
In the systems-engineering MESSAGE model [13), tech-
nical, economic, and environmental parameters for over 400 
technologies are specified explicitly. Technological change 
is introduced exogenously, that is, performance of technolo-
gies improves at predefined rates over time. Compared to 
historical experience [17), the resulting learning rates for 
renewable technologies in the Bl-H2 scenario are on the 
optimistic end. For example, the learning rate for photo-
voltaic power plants in Bl -H2 is nearly 20 percent, i.e. cost 
reductions of20 percent per doubling of cumulative installed 
capacity. This is a learning _rate comparable to estimated 
historical learning rates from 1968 to 1998 at the global level 
[18). Fossil-based technologies also improve their perfor-
mance and cost characteristics but, depending on the fuel, 
the pace is different. Coal-based technologies experience 
only low-to-moderate improvements, reflecting the decreas-
ing environmental and social attractiveness of its use, while 
oil- and gas-based ones do so at average-to-high rates. 
As for hydrogen technologies, we have conducted an 
in-depth survey of the published literature and publicly 
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Fig. I . Investment cost of hydrogen production plants as a function 
of production capacity as reported by a number of sources in the 
literature [ 19). 
available databases related to the whole hydrogen energy 
chain, i.e. from hydrogen production to end-use technolo-
gies, with emphasis on the examination of cost estimates. 
As an example, Fig. 1 shows the investment cost of dif-
ferent hydrogen production plants as a function of the 
hydrogen capacity reported by different sources in the lit-
erature. In the capacity of over one million N m3-H2/ day, 
SMR technology bas the least-expensive investment cost 
in comparison to other hydrogen production methods. The 
survey is described in detail in (19]. 
Based on such survey, we have selected cost and ef-
ficiency parameters for the hydrogen-based technologies 
included in our scenario. The survey comprised not only 
those hydrogen technologies currently available but also 
some advanced promising processes. However, for many 
of the processes still in early stages of development, cost 
estimates are not available or unreliable and, therefore, they 
were not included. Still, we recognize that new technologies 
could emerge that could trigger a profound transformation of 
the production, storage, transportation and use of hydrogen. 
The development of investment costs for the main hy-
drogen production technologies in the Bl-H2 scenario is 
given in Fig. 2. The initial costs in the base year (1990) 
were selected from the range of cost estimates summarized 
in the technology assessment. We consider the following 
technologies for the conversion of secondary and primary 
fuels into hydrogen: ( 1) electrolysis (using all types of re-
newable and fossil electricity as input), (2) coal gasifica-
tion, (3) steam methane reforming of natural gas, ( 4) partial 
oxidation of fuel oil, ( 5) solar thermal cracking, ( 6) biomass 
gasification and (7) cogeneration of electricity and hydrogen 
via high-temperature nuclear reactors. 2 Consistent with the 
2 Note that for the literature survey, cost data for hydrogen 
production from solar thermal cracking and from high-temperature 
nuclear reactors were not available. For these technologies, we 
adopted the costs from the SRES-81 scenario [11 ,20). 
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experience for nuclear technologies. 
storyline of the scenario, all hydrogen technologies experi-
ence significant but still plausible cost improvements. 
3.3. Resource availability 
Assumptions on the fossil-fuel resource base are based on 
the estimates reported by Rogner [21]. The categorization 
distinguishes between conventional and unconventional 
reserves and resources and reflects increasing degrees of ge-
ological uncertainty and decreasing degrees of economic at-
tractiveness. Consistent with the environmentally conscious 
and resource-conservation drive underlying this scenario, a 
conservative availability of oil and gas resources is assumed. 
The oil resource base is limited to conventional resources 
and potential for their enhanced recovery. This corresponds 
to categories I-IV in (21]. Categories I-III represent conven-
tional reserves and resources. Category IV represents the po-
tential for enhanced recovery of the conventional resources. 
As for natural gas, both conventional and unconventional 
occurrences are taken into account, but the categories labeled 
as "additional occurrences", for which the highest uncer-
tainty exists and which are not likely to be exploited with the 
foreseeable technological developments, are not included. 
Coal resources are also based on (21] and are consid-
ered abundant. Coal extraction costs are assumed to rise in 
regions with large shares of deep mines and high popula-
tion densities but they remain relatively low in regions rich 
in surface coal reserves. 
More important than the assumptions on the ultimate 
resource base is, however, the actual resource use and the 
question whether the (world/ regional) resource constraints 
were binding. The cumulative resource consumption, shown 
in Table 1, results from the interplay of the different driv-
ing forces involved in the scenario and represents a more 
appropriate indicator than the exogenously specified re-
source base. Table 1 summarizes the global hydrocarbon 
resource availability and the cumulative fossil fuel use of 
the B l-H2 scenario. 
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Table 1 
Eight categories of conventional and unconventional oil and gas reserves, resources and additional occurrences in zetajoules, ZJ (1021 J). 
The table shows which of the categories are deployed in the B l-H2 scenario and compares cumulative use from 1990 to 2100 with historical 
consumption from 1860 to 1998 
Conventional Unconventional 
reserves and 
resources 
Enhanced Recoverable 
recovery 
l,II,III IV v VI 
Oil 12.4 5.8 1.9 14.1 
Gas 16.5 2.3 5.8 10.8 
Scenario assumptions 
I,Il,III IV v VI 
Bl-H2 Gas/ oil Gas/ oil Gas Gas 
For non-fossil resources, like uranium and renewable 
energy, future resource potentials are primarily a function 
of the assumed rates of technological change, energy prices, 
and other factors such as safety and risk considerations for 
nuclear power generation. 
3.4. The development of primary energy 
Fig. 3 illustrates the projected changes in the global 
primary-energy structure over time. 3 The historical changes 
reflect major technology shifts, from traditional use of 
renewable energy flows to the coal and steam age of the 
19th century to the dominance of oil along the 20th century 
and the later emergence of natural gas. 
The B l-H2 scenario illustrates a relatively smooth tran-
sition toward a post-fossil global energy system. Fossil 
fuels still dominate the primary energy supply until 2050, 
but during this period, the system shifts away from coal and 
oil, which reduce their shares substantially, toward natural 
gas. The latter operates as the main transitional fuel to the 
post-fossil era, which unfolds in the second half of the 21st 
century. During this period, remarkable structural changes 
become evident. Global primary energy consumption peaks 
at around 900 EJ in 2070 and declines afterwards. Renew-
able energy sources, in particular biomass, increase their 
shares substantially. A transition to a decentralized energy 
system takes place. 
3 In this paper, we adopt the direct equivalent method as pri-
mary energy accounting methodology for all non-thermal uses of 
renewables and nuclear. Using this method, for instance, the pri-
mary energy equivalence of electricity generated from solar pho-
tovoltaics or nuclear power plants is set equal to their respective 
gross electricity output. 
Unconventional and 
additional occurrences 
Consumption 
1860-1998 
VII VIII Total 
24.6 35.2 94 5.1 
16.2 785.4 837.I 2.4 
Scenario result 1990- 2100 
VII VIII Oil Gas 
16.6 24.2 
An intensive decarbonization of the energy supply accom-
panies these transformations. C02 emissions peak at about 
10.5 gigatons of carbon (GtC) in 2040 and reach 5.7 GtC in 
2100, a lower value than in 1990. Fig. 4 presents the evo-
lution of the carbon intensity of the global primary energy 
supply for the 20th century and the trend in the Bl-H2 sce-
nario for the 21st century. The historical development from 
1900 to 1990 shows a persistent but slow decarbonization 
trend of the world's energy system at approximately 0.3 
percent per year [23] . In Bl-H2the decarbonization trend is 
substantially accelerated. Between the years 1990 and 2100, 
the carbon intensity of global primary energy is reduced at 
an annual average rate of0.8 percent per year, as the energy 
system becomes increasingly non-fossil based. 
In B l-H2, the combination of a number of technical and 
societal structural changes, associated with substantial ef-
ficiency improvements at the end-use-energy level, leads 
to a relatively moderate increase of final energy demands 
during the first half of the 21st century and to a decline 
during the second half of the century. This pattern is re-
flected in corresponding trends in the production of different 
energy carriers (hydrogen among them) and primary energy 
consumption. With a fast economic growth and significant 
structural changes in the energy system, a strong decoupling 
between economic activity and energy consumption takes 
place in the 21st century. Primary energy intensity, i.e. the 
amount of primary energy used per unit of GDP, is substan-
tially reduced, reflecting the substantial technical progress 
assumed to prevail in the B l-H2 scenario, at approximately 
1.8 percent per annum, well below the historical trend. 
3.5. Global and world regional strategies for hydrogen 
production 
At the global level, hydrogen is produced with a diver-
sified mix of technologies (see Fig. 5). Stearn reforming 
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of natural gas and gasification of biomass play the lead-
ing roles. Along the most part of the time horizon, steam 
reforming holds the largest share of supply. In the last 
decades of the 21st century, however, the rapidly increasing 
production from biomass becomes the most important sup-
ply source at the global scale. Significant contributions are 
also made by the solar thermal technology and, to a lower 
extent, by coal gasification. The latter operates as a transition 
technology. Nuclear high-temperature reactors and elec-
trolysis play marginal roles. Still, they constitute valuable 
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complementary options in particular niche markets. Fol-
lowing considerable economic and technological structural 
changes and substantial energy efficient improvements, 
global hydrogen production peaks at 330 EJ/ yr around the 
year 2080 and declines afterwards. 
As illustrated by the hydrogen production system result-
ing in this scenario, natural gas could have a crucial role in 
enabling the successful penetration of hydrogen. Gas is the 
cleanest hydrocarbon fuel and an abundant resource, which 
appears as one of the most promising alternatives to provide 
for clean energy services well into the 2 lst century [25]. The 
development of associated infrastructures and technologies 
could bring the energy system into an "energy gases era". 
Hydrogen, also a gaseous fuel, would fit well into a natu-
ral gas-dominated energy system. It can be produced from 
gas and could profit from its transportation and distribution 
infrastructures. 
Steam reforming of natural gas is currently the most 
widely applied and least expensive method for hydrogen 
production and could be key in stimulating the penetration 
of hydrogen into the marketplace, paving the way for the 
introduction of renewable hydrogen systems. A gas-based 
hydrogen production system would benefit from the dynamic 
build-up of gas production and transportation infrastructures 
and the development of a cluster of advanced methane-based 
technologies and could be a bridge to a post-fossil hydrogen 
production system [6]. 
Developing highly efficient and cost-effective small-scale 
steam reforming technologies that can be applied in dis-
tributed production sites could be the key to overcome some 
of the barriers imposed by the lack ofa large-scale hydrogen 
delivery infrastructure [7]. Decentralized small-scale re-
forming of natural gas would produce hydrogen close to the 
point of use, while profiting from existing natural gas dis-
tribution systems. Where inexpensive off-peak electricity is 
available, electrolyzers could play a similar role, benefiting 
from the existing power distribution network. Eventually, as 
the demand for hydrogen grows, centralized large-scale pro-
duction plants, which, among others, could facilitate carbon 
capture and sequestration, may enter the market and a 
hydrogen transportation and distribution infrastructure 
could develop. 
Renewable resources, specifically biomass and solar 
energy, also make a very significant contribution to hydro-
gen production in this scenario. Conversion of biomass into 
modem energy carriers becomes very significant in the long 
term in the sustainability-conscious Bl-H2 world. Hydrogen 
production is no exception. Significant cost and perfor-
mance improvements make biomass gasification emerge as 
one of the most attractive methods for hydrogen production 
in the long term, particularly in the developing regions (see 
Fig. 6). The technology also makes sizeable inroads in the 
developed regions. Of course, the successful application of 
biomass technologies for hydrogen production presupposes 
finding solutions to a number of issues that currently pre-
vent biomass from having a more relevant role in meeting 
energy needs and have to be dealt with for biomass to be 
produced in a sustainable way (see e.g. [26]). 
Solar thermal hydrogen production systems also make a 
sizeable contribution in this scenario. At the global level, 
its contribution peaks at 20 percent in 2080 and declines af-
terwards to 8 percent at the end of the 21st century. At the 
regional level, it has an important contribution in the devel-
oping regions. The long-term potential for producing hydro-
gen from solar energy is enormous and hydrogen represents 
a convenient medium to overcome the problems posed by 
the intermittence of this source. Solar hydrogen provides an 
adequate, less land-intensive, complement to biomass-based 
systems, which could definitely constitute one of the pillars 
of a long-term sustainable hydrogen production system. 
Since renewable-based technologies offer significant en-
vironmental advantages, coal gasification does not become a 
significant hydrogen production alternative in this scenario. 
Still, it plays a transitional role in developing regions en-
dowed with significant coal resources, in particular ASIA. 
For those regions, conversion of coal to hydrogen already 
represents an important advance toward better quality fuels. 
On the one hand, the gasification process has the potential to 
achieve high operating efficiencies and has near-zero emis-
sions of sulfur, nitrogen oxides and particulates and, on the 
other hand, using hydrogen at the final energy level offers 
significant advantages over the direct utilization of coal. 
This, of course, does not exclude other renewable-based 
technologies from playing a role in a sustainable "hydrogen 
economy" in the long-term future. On the contrary, ours is 
but one example of how such a system could develop. Many 
different sustainable hydrogen-based energy systems could 
be possible and might have chances to unfold in the uncer-
tain future. It becomes necessary to quantify the long-term 
characteristics of those possible alternative energy systems. 
In particular, wind or solar photovoltaic-based systems 
could also play a role in a renewable-based hydrogen pro-
duction system in the long term. However, as of today, 
photovoltaic-based (or wind-based) water electrolysis is 
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Fig. 6. Hydrogen production mix in the four global macro-regions in the Bl-H2 scenario. 
still one of the most expensive hydrogen production systems 
[3], among other factors because of the electricity costs. 
That being said, it must be recognized that wind turbines 
and solar photovoltaic systems have experienced a substan-
tial progress along their learning curves (see e.g. [27,28]) 
and they still have potential to develop further. In addition, 
some promising advances in electrolyzers are being made. 
Specifically, compact proton-exchange-membrane (PEM) 
electrolyzers may offer attractive possibilities (see e.g. [29]) 
and could fit well in a distributed energy system such as 
the one portrayed here. Moreover, PEM electrolyzers could 
benefit from technological learning spillovers from the 
development of PEM fuel cells. 4 
Regarding this and other alternatives, it must be stated 
that long-term future technological developments are highly 
uncertain and the outcome of technological change pro-
cesses, in particular, the emergence of radical innovations, 
are difficult to predict. Therefore, the possibility of break-
throughs on innovative technologies that could change sub-
4 Technological learning plays an important role in achieving 
the cost reductions and performance improvements necessary for 
a technology to become competitive in the marketplace [30). Al-
though difficult to quantify, spillovers of technological learning 
between different technologies can occur [31). Related or comple-
mentary technologies could benefit from the learning processes of 
each other. This "technological proximity" may stimulate a collec-
tive learning and co-evolution process. 
stantially the panorama of hydrogen production in the future 
cannot be ruled out. 
We tum now to the structure of the regional hydrogen sup-
ply systems. In all regions, hydrogen becomes an important 
energy carrier and a corresponding production infrastructure 
is developed. The structure of the regional hydrogen produc-
tion systems very much reflects the resources (indigenous 
or imported) available in each region (see Fig. 6). 
The industrialized regions (OECD90 and REF) rely 
heavily on steam reforming of natural gas for the hydro-
gen supply. In the OECD90, natural gas, part of which 
is imported from the REF region, accounts for the bulk 
of hydrogen production. Nuclear high-temperature reac-
tors and biomass gasification are also applied, but their 
share begins to be noticeable only in the second half 
of the century. A small transitional contribution comes 
from coal gasification. In the case of REF, indigenous gas 
resources provide the largest part of H2 production al-
though, toward the end of the century, an increasing share of 
biomass gasification becomes noticeable. Coal gasification 
holds also a small share of the production along the time 
horizon. 
The developing regions show a more diversified pattern, 
with less reliance on natural gas. Biomass gasification and 
solar thermal plants have the highest contributions to the 
long-term supply. By the end of the 21st century, biomass 
gasification becomes the dominant option in those regions 
accounting for 53 percent of hydrogen production in ASIA 
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and 64 percent in the ALM region. As mentioned before, 
solar thermal hydrogen production systems also make an 
important contribution. Peak shares of 30 and 25 percent are 
reached in 2080 in ASIA and ALM respectively. 
Coal gasification and steam reforming, however, still have 
a considerable participation, although mainly in the first half 
of the century. Coal-based hydrogen is particularly impor-
tant in ASIA, where countries such as China and India lack 
significant gas resources. Coal-based systems still provide 
approximately 15 percent of the total hydrogen production 
of the region at the end of the 21st century. In contrast, in 
the ALM region, where ample gas resources are available, 
the steam reforming technology provides a more significant 
contribution. It holds 40 percent of the total production in the 
year 2050 but its share declines to 25 percent at the end of the 
21st century as renewable sources become dominant. Coal 
gasification plays a more reduced role in the ALM region, 
strongly declining its participation in the hydrogen-supply 
mix toward the end of the 21st century. 
No significant amounts of hydrogen are traded across 
world regions in this scenario. Hydrogen pipelines were not 
considered and transporting liquefied hydrogen in ships does 
not become cost effective. In addition, although the injec-
tion of small fractions (up to 10% on a volume basis) of 
hydrogen into the natural gas pipelines is possible, no sig-
nificant amounts are transported this way. Thus, hydrogen is 
made where it is required, close to the demand centers and 
mainly using indigenous resources. Still, hydrogen produc-
tion has some noticeable impact on the international trade 
of natural gas. Specifically, Western Europe imports signif-
icant amounts of gas from the Former Soviet Union that 
is used as a feedstock for its hydrogen production. Our re-
sult is consistent with current and foreseeable cost trends 
that indicate that several of the feedstocks used to produce 
hydrogen can be transported over long distances cheaper 
than hydrogen itself (3] . 
This dispersed Hi supply brings tangible benefits in 
terms of security of supply for a number of regions. 
Without excessive reliance on imported feedstocks or 
dependence on long-distance transportation infrastruc-
tures, such Hi production infrastructure contributes to cast 
a better geographical balance of energy resources and 
reduce vulnerability to geopolitical uncertainties and secu-
rity risks. 
In summary, the regional hydrogen supply systems in the 
B 1-H2 scenario evolve in a diversified way according to 
the resources at hand. In industrialized regions, hydrogen 
production remains mainly fossil based, with steam reform-
ing of natural gas as the dominant technology. Still, other 
options, biomass gasification in particular, also make size-
able contributions. In the developing regions, on the other 
hand, although fossil-based production technologies, i.e. 
steam reforming of natural gas and coal gasification, play 
an important role, the system evolves much more rapidly 
to a predominantly renewable-based structure, relying on 
biomass gasification and solar thermal plants. 
3. 6. Electricity generation and the role of fuel cells 
In the B 1-H2 scenario, electricity production strongly 
shifts away from traditional centralized fossil-based tech-
nologies toward post-fossil and zero-carbon generation 
systems. Such transition contributes substantially to achieve 
sustainable-development goals in the electricity system. 
By the end of the 21st century, hydrogen-based fuel cells, 
renewables and nuclear power plants become the leading 
suppliers, while coal and oil power plants are completely 
phased out. The only fossil fuel that remains is natural gas 
and its share is small compared to other options. However, 
natural gas power plants, more specifically the gas-fired 
combined cycle, play an important role "bridging" the 
long-term transition to advanced post-fossil systems. Fig. 7 
presents the market shares of generation technologies in the 
global electricity mix for the years 2020, 2050 and 2100. 
The transformation of the global electricity sector is sub-
stantial, not only regarding primary fuels, but also regarding 
its very nature. Large-scale centralized power plants give 
way to small-scale distributed generation systems that oper-
ate nearer the point of use. A substantial amount of highly 
efficient, cost-effective and less vulnerable micropower sys-
tems penetrates the global electricity markets at a quick pace, 
driven by technological breakthroughs and accompanied by 
a favorable institutional and regulatory revolution. 
With increasing production volume, micropower 
technologies progress rapidly along their learning curves, 
experiencing significant cost reductions and performance 
improvements. This, together with additional benefits on 
reliability, reduced environmental impacts, shorter times to 
market, averting transmission and distribution costs, flexi-
bility, etc., contribute to make them the preferred options 
(32]. Parallel to their penetration, advanced communica-
tions, control and metering technologies are developed and 
applied in "intelligent" electrical grids, allowing the flexible 
and reliable operation of the distributed power generation 
system. 
By the end of the 21st century, decentralized systems, 
mainly hydrogen-based fuel cells and on-site solar pho-
tovoltaics installations, hold almost a 50 percent share of 
the global electricity market. Fuel cells, in particular, ex-
perience a dramatic growth. Electricity co-generation in 
industrial and residential stationary fuel-cell applications 
and generation from mobile hydrogen-based fuel cells in 
the transportation sector (e.g. fuel-cell-powered cars gener-
ating electricity while parked) become major contributors 
to the generation mix, accounting for approximately 38 
percent of the global generation market in 2100. 
In this scenario, hydrogen-based fuel cells play a major 
role while fuel cells powered by fossil fuels, such as natural 
gas or coal, only have a minor contribution (see Fig. 7). 
Hydrogen-based fuel cells do not emit carbon at the point 
of generation, but the hydrogen production system can still 
be responsible for carbon emissions if fossil fuels are used 
as feedstocks. However, the increasing renewable share 
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Fig. 8. Global electricity generation from hydrogen-based fuel cells 
in the B l-H2 scenario. Contributions of electricity production from 
mobile fuel cells in the transportation sector (top) and co-generation 
from stationary fuel cells in residential/ commercial and industrial 
applications (bottom) are distinguished. 
in the hydrogen production system makes hydrogen-based · 
fuel cells important components in the transition toward a 
zero-emission electricity system. 
Fig. 8 depicts the global electricity generation from hy-
drogen fuel cells distinguishing between the contributions of 
stationary co-generation facilities in residential/commercial 
and industrial applications and off-peak electricity genera-
tion from fuel cells in the transportation sector. Global gen-
eration from fuel cells peaks at 110 EJ/yr in the year 2080 
and experiences some decline afterwards. As mentioned be-
fore, such a decrease is in line with the lower consumption 
of final energy carriers resulting from the high efficiency 
improvements at the end-use level assumed in this scenario. 
However, as shown above, the fraction of the global market 
captured by fuel cells continues to grow steadily along the 
21st century. 
Both stationary co-generation facilities and electricity 
production from mobile sources play important roles. Ini-
tially, the contribution of stationary applications is larger 
but, as technological, institutional and regulatory develop-
ments unfold, mobile sources of power are able to increase 
their electricity output. This parallel growth allows syn-
ergies between both market segments facilitating both the 
fuel cells production volumes build-up and the deployment 
of hydrogen production and delivery systems. 
3. 7. Hydrogen as the main final energy carrier 
During the course of the 21st century, the final energy mix 
of the Bl-H2 scenario changes considerably, as the trend 
toward cleaner, more flexible and convenient energy carriers 
continues (see Fig. 9). 
Solid fuels, such as coal and biomass, are gradually 
phased out of the final energy market. Oil products, 
today's prevailing fuels, reduce their share drastically. 
Grid-delivered energy carriers as electricity and hydrogen 
increasingly dominate the final-energy mix. Hydrogen, in 
particular, driven by the penetration of efficient end-use 
technologies, increases its share dramatically, accounting 
for approximately 49 percent of the global final consump-
278 L. Barreto et al. I International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 28 (2003) 267-284 
~ 
e 
., 
.l! 
(/) 
> 
e> 
., 
c 
w 
;;; 
c 
i.: 
;;; 
..0 
0 
a 
100 
BO 
60 
40 
20 
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 
D Hydrogen 
IB Electricity 
D Natural Gas 
• District Heat 
liliAlcohols 
•Oil products 
lli!Biomass 
•Coal 
Fig. 9. Evolution of global market shares of different final-energy 
carriers for the period 1990- 2100 in the Bl-H2 scenario. The 
alcohols category includes methanol and ethanol. 
40 ............ . 
~ 
~ 
l!! 30 ........ .. . . . 
ta 
.c (/) 
~ 20 .. . . . .. . 
... 
ta 
::iE 
10 
4t;;. 
0 +--=" ..... .......... _._ 
Transport Res./Comm. 
i;J 2020 
D 2050 
. .... . . .. •2100 
Industry 
Fig. 10. Global shares of hydrogen in the final-energy mix of the 
transportation, residential/ commercial and industrial sectors for the 
years 2020, 2050 and 2100 in the Bl-H2 scenario. 
ti on by the end of the 21st century, and becomes the main 
final energy carrier. 
With intensified R& D efforts and setting in motion 
sound deployment strategies, substantial but achievable 
performance improvements and cost reductions occur in 
hydrogen-based technologies and they diffuse widely. 
Hydrogen technologies are introduced in a variety of 
applications across all end-use sectors, being particularly 
successful in mobile applications in the transportation 
sector and in stationary co-generation applications in the 
residential/ commercial sector. 
Fig. 10 illustrates the global market shares of hydrogen in 
the final-energy mix of the industrial, residential/ commercial 
and transportation sectors for the years 2020, 2050 and 
2100. 
In this scenario, a "revolution" takes place in the trans-
portation sector, as the dependence on oil products is 
strongly reduced. The severe burden imposed by transporta-
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Fig. 11. Evolution of the market share of fuel cells versus the 
aggregate of other technologies in the global transportation sector 
in the Bl-H2 scenario. 
tion activities on the environment at the local, regional and 
global levels and the growing share of its energy consump-
tion make the move to a sustainable transportation system a 
priority target. Alternative fuels such as hydrogen, methanol 
(made of fossil sources, primarily natural gas) and ethanol 
(synthesized from biomass) capture significant shares of 
the market displacing oil products. By 2050, hydrogen 
accounts for already 25 percent of the global final-energy 
consumption in the transportation sector and by the end of 
the 21st century its share will have risen to 50 percent. 
Fuel cells drive forward this transformation. Being ei-
ther directly fueled by hydrogen, or by ethanol or methanol 
combined with an on-board fuel processor to obtain the 
hydrogen required, fuel cells penetrate extensively the trans-
portation markets, displacing currently dominating technolo-
gies such as the internal combustion engine. Fig. 11 presents 
the evolution of the market share of fuel cells versus the 
aggregate of other technologies in the global transportation 
sector during the 21st century in our scenario. The aggre-
gate share of fuel cells is already 51 percent in the year 2050 
and rises to 71percentin2100. The main role is played by 
hydrogen-based fuel cells, but alcohol-based fuel cells op-
erate as important complementary options. 
Penetration of hydrogen in the residential/ commercial 
markets is also substantial, as fuel cell co-generation of 
electricity and heat becomes an attractive option. Driven by 
the penetration of stationary fuel cells appropriately scaled 
to the buildings ' needs, hydrogen reaches 38 percent of 
the final-energy consumption of the residential/ commercial 
sector in the year 2050 and accounts for almost 50 per-
cent at the end of the 21st century. Its penetration is much 
lower in the industrial sector where many applications can 
be effectively served directly by electricity. Still, with fuel 
cell co-generation providing energy services to important 
industrial niche markets, hydrogen captures 8 percent of 
the final-energy mix of this sector in the year 2050. This 
share increases to 1 7 percent in 2100. 
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From today' s perspective, if penetration of hydrogen and 
fuel cells is to be successful, opportunities in different sec-
tors must be tapped. Transportation constitutes indeed a pri-
mary target market for both fuel cells and hydrogen. Market 
potential is huge and benefits can be very significant. Among 
others, fuel cell vehicles could contribute significantly to 
curb air pollution, increase energy efficiency and reduce 
dependence on fossil fuels and could be favored by spe-
cific policies to introduce low-emission vehicles. However, 
barriers for the penetration, ranging from supply infrastruc-
tures to on board storage problems and perceived safety risks, 
appear to be high. Other market segments, where barriers 
are less severe, may offer attractive opportunities to stimu-
late early introduction. Potential synergies between, for in-
stance, the buildings and vehicles markets could be used 
to make hydrogen a more attractive alternative and help to 
overcome the initial infrastructure barrier [7). 
This calls for a coordinated strategy for the deployment of 
hydrogen technologies in different market segments, in order 
to profit from potential synergies and benefit from the cost 
reductions as the volume of manufacturing and sales builds 
up. R& D, demonstration and commercialization strategies 
must be targeted at overcoming the barriers specific to each 
market segment while exploiting the advantages of hydrogen 
[33). 
3.8. Hydrogen and global warming 
This section describes the global environmental con-
sequences of the carbon concentration and emission tra-
jectory derived from the quantification of the B l-H2 
scenario. In order to provide an adequate perspec-
tive, we will compare the climate impacts of Bl-H2 
with a scenario where the long-term patterns of change 
are guided by "dynamics-as-usual" trends. Generally, 
"dynamics-as-usual" scenarios assume that rates of change 
for the main scenario drivers, such as technological enhance-
ment, demographic changes, and economic development 
follow historical experience. Hence, they tend to result in 
relatively high levels of GHG emissions and climate_ impacts 
[34). Standard indicators of climate impacts are radiative 
forcing and global mean temperature change [35). Using 
these indicators, and considering the uncertainty associated 
with them, we will explore to which extent the introduction 
of hydrogen mitigates global impacts of climate change. 
To estimate possible global climate effects of the 
Bl-H2 scenario, the climate model MAGICC (version 
2.3) was used [36). For the Bl-H2 scenario, we esti-
mated the direct and indirect GHG emissions including 
C02, CH.i, N20, S02, CFC/HFC/HCFC, PFC, SF6, CO, 
VOCs and NOx . Non-energy-sector emissions were esti-
mated using corresponding land-use change model runs 
with equivalent input assumptions based on the IPCC-Bl 
scenario developed with the AIM model [37). Halocar-
bon emissions are based on estimates for the SRES-Bl 
scenario by Fenhann [38) . In this section, we will mainly 
focus on C02 emissions and concentrations, today's main 
contributors to global warming [39). 
The C02 emissions resulting in the Bl-H2 scenario are 
compared to a dynamics-as-usual case in Fig. 12. As the 
dynamics-as-usual scenario, we selected the IIASA B2 
marker scenario developed for the IPCC-SRES [11). For 
details on the B2 scenario, see [34). 
In B2, global carbon emissions from energy use and 
industrial sources rise from 6.2 GtC in 1990 to 14.2 GtC in 
2100. In contrast, due to the rapid introduction of hydrogen 
technologies, C02 emissions from energy and industrial 
sources in the Bl-H2 scenario are considerably lower. The 
initial raise of C02 emissions in B l-H2along the first half of 
the 21st century is mainly a result of the growth of energy 
demand. During this period, however, hydrogen infrastruc-
tures develop and become progressively more important in 
decarbonizing the energy system. Emissions peak around 
10.5 GtC in 2040 and decrease later below 1990 emissions 
in 2100 (5.7 GtC), when hydrogen production shifts toward 
renewable sources (see Fig. 12). 
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The resulting atmospheric carbon concentrations of the 
scenarios are illustrated in Fig_ 13. The carbon concentra-
tions climb steadily under dynamics-as-usual assumptions 
and reach 600 parts per million by volume (ppmv) in 2100. 
In contrast, B l-H2 depicts a route to stabilizing the concen-
trations at about 500 ppmv. 5 As illustrated in Fig. 13, even 
the upper bound of the uncertainty range for the B l-H2 sce-
nario stabilizes at 540 ppmv, which is considerably below 
the best-guess estimate of the dynamics-as-usual scenario. 
Fig. 14 illustrates total radiative forcing due to all GHG 
and aerosol emissions relative to 1990. In the year 2100, 
total radiative forcing differs significantly between Bl-H2 
and the dynamics-as-usual scenario. As with carbon 
emissions and concentrations, radiative forcing climbs 
steadily under dynamics-as-usual assumptions and reaches 
4.1 W /rn2 in 2100. In contrast, B l-H2 depicts a route to 
stabilizing forcing at about 3.2 W/m2. Up to about the year 
2070, however, total radiative forcing is almost identical 
for the scenarios. This is due to the combined inertia of 
the energy system and the climate system, and a balancing 
effect of sulfur emissions. Compared to dynamics-as-usual, 
the more rapid technological progress in the B l-H2 scenario 
5 The uncertainty range for the carbon concentrations is due 
to the present uncertainties associated with net carbon sinks. The 
uncertainty range of carbon concentrations was calculated with 
MAGICC by the variation of the 1980s-mean value of net land-use 
change C02 emissions. The l 980s-mean value approximates the 
net assumed C02 fertilization effect, i.e. the biosphere acts as a 
larger or smaller net carbon "sink" thus resulting, respectively, 
in lower or higher atmospheric concentrations of C02. For the 
best-guess estimates, we assumed I.I GtC/yr, which corresponds 
to the IPCC Second Assessment Report mid-range value [35]. For 
the uncertainty range, we used the IPCC-defined range of 0.4 and 
1.8 GtC/yr. 
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Fig. 14. Global radiative forcing change relative to 1990 for the 
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Fig. 15. Global mean temperature change. Future trajectories for the 
B l-H2 (gray) and the "dynamics-as-usual" (black, white circles) 
scenarios, assuming an intermediate "best guess" climate sensitivity 
of 2.5° C for a doubling of C02 concentration. The thin lines 
depict the uncertainty range for B l-H2 given by the variation of 
the climate sensitivity between 1.5° C and 4.5° C. 
results in lower C02, but also lower sulfur emissions. Re-
duction of sulfur emissions enhances radiative forcing and 
GHG-induced warming, in contrast to C02 emissions where 
radiative forcing is enhanced in line with rising emissions. 
These two effects counterbalance each other until C02 emis-
sions start differing substantially in the two scenarios. The 
radiative forcing until 2060 is slightly higher for the Bl-H2 
as compared to the dynamics-as-usual case (see Fig. 14 ). 
Global mean temperature change (see Fig. 15) shows a 
similar pattern as radiative forcing. The mean temperature 
in the dynamics-as-usual case increases steadily and heads 
upwards in 2100. Meanwhile in B l-H2, temperature starts to 
level off in the 2070s to stabilize later at the end of the cen-
tury. If we use a "best-guess" climate sensitivity of 2.5° C, 
we estimate global mean temperature to change until the 
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year 2100 by about 1.8 ° C for B l-H2 and about 2 ° C for the 
dynamics-as-usual scenario. 6 However, the climate sensi-
tivity parameter is highly uncertain, and consequently the 
uncertainty range for temperature change (calculated by the 
variation of the climate sensitivity parameter) for Bl-H2 is 
vast (see Fig. 15). For the year 2100, the range is from 1.2° C 
to 2.6° C. Most interestingly, the corresponding upper bound 
for Bl-H2 is much higher than the best-guess estimate for 
the dynamics-as-usual scenario (2° C). 
The results illustrate that, although the massive intro-
duction of renewable hydrogen succeeds in the long-term 
decarbonization of the energy system, the actions taken 
might still not be sufficient to protect against the risk of high 
climate sensitivities and, hence, high climate impacts. Fu-
ture policies should therefore focus on the timely develop-
ment of technologies, which could enable an even more rapid 
reduction of carbon from the atmosphere than in B l-H2. As 
illustrated in this paper, hydrogen-based technologies could 
constitute flexible risk management options for the energy 
system and, thus, would be prime candidates for a hedging 
strategy against an uncertain climate future. 
Our scenario results also highlight another promising 
alternative that could be part of a portfolio of climate risk 
management options. In B l-H2, biomass gasification is 
one of the main sources of hydrogen. Besides enabling the 
production of carbon-neutral energy carriers (if biomass is 
produced in a sustainable way), biomass-based energy 
technologies can be combined with carbon capture and 
sequestration [40]. Doing so could result in additional 
cumulative emissions reductions of carbon throughout 
the century, and hence, these technologies could play an 
important role in limiting climate change risks. 
4. Conclusions 
Hydrogen has an outstanding potential for being a key 
factor in driving the global energy system to a sustain-
able trajectory. It can deliver high-quality, highly efficient 
energy services while contributing to reduce local, regional 
and global environmental impacts. This paper presents the 
quantification of the global energy scenario Bl-H2, which 
illustrates a long-term transitional path from today's fos-
sil fuel-based energy system toward a clean and sustainable 
hydrogen future. 
B l-H2 presents an affluent, low population growth world 
driven by equity and sustainability issues, thus providing an 
adequate framework to analyze the potential contribution 
6 The climate sensitivity defines the equilibrium response of 
global mean surface air temperature to an instantaneous doubling 
of C02 or C02-equivalent concentration. The mid-range estimate 
of this parameter given in [35) is 2.5 °C, with a range of l.5-4°C. 
These three values for climate sensitivity (l.5°C, 2.5°C and 4°C) 
define the uncertainty of global temperature change for the B l-H2 
scenario illustrated in Fig. 15 . 
of hydrogen technologies . . In B l-H2, hydrogen becomes 
the main long-term final-energy carrier and corresponding 
production and distribution infrastructures are developed. 
Hydrogen-based technologies diffuse rapidly and play a 
major role in a substantial transformation of the structure 
of the global energy system. As a result, a more flexible, 
distributed, less vulnerable and secure system emerges, 
which meets energy needs in a cleaner, more efficient and 
cost-effective way. 
Fuel cells play a central part in the transformation por-
trayed by the Bl-H2 scenario. Being a versatile, clean and 
flexible technology, fuel cells become a major option in pro-
viding transportation services and supplying heat and elec-
tricity for a wide range of applications. As they diffuse, fuel 
cells enable far-reaching changes in those sectors. Specifi-
cally, together with other distributed-generation alternatives 
they contribute substantially to the shift to a more flexible, 
cleaner and less vulnerable distributed electricity generation 
system. In addition, they become a strategic component of 
the transition to a far less polluting and less oil-dependent 
transportation system. 
The production system, initially fossil-based (steam 
reforming of natural gas), evolves toward renewable re-
sources (solar and biomass) in the long run, contributing to 
drive the global energy system to a sustainable trajectory. No 
significant trade of hydrogen occurs but regional hydrogen 
production systems still have some impact on the trade vol-
umes of other energy carries, specifically natural gas. In gen-
eral, however, in Bl-H2 hydrogen is produced close to the 
demand centers, mainly from indigenously available re-
sources. This dispersed H2 supply brings tangible benefits 
in terms of security of supply for a number of regions, as 
it contributes to reduce their reliance on imported energy 
carriers and their dependence on long-distance transporta-
tion infrastructures, thus mitigating the vulnerability to 
geopolitical uncertainties. 
Although in Bl-H2, the global hydrogen production sys-
tem progressively shifts toward renewable sources, signif-
icant differences subsist in the hydrogen production mix 
across different regions along the time horizon. Specifically, 
industrialized regions rely mainly on steam reforming ofnat-
ural gas to satisfy their hydrogen needs, while developing 
regions, where a higher demand for hydrogen occurs, rely 
on a more diversified supply system with a higher share of 
renewable-based hydrogen production. 
This highlights the multiple ways in which a "hydrogen 
economy" can evolve, depending, among other factors , on 
the infrastructure available in a particular region. Where 
gas infrastructures are in place or in development, such 
as in the developed world, the hydrogen production sys-
tem could evolve to rely more on natural gas, at least in 
the · medium term. On the other hand, in many develop-
ing countries, where much less infrastructure is available 
and energy demands are likely to grow much faster, 
the system could move more readily into a renewable-
based path. For the latter, however, this would entail the 
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Table 2 
Coal Stdu 
Coal Stda 
Coa!Adv 
Oil 
GasStd 
Gas CC 
GasReinj 
Fossil FC 
Waste 
BioSTC 
Bio_GTC 
Nuc..LC 
NucJIC 
Nuc& O_carb 
Hydro 
SolarTb 
SolarPV 
Wind 
Geothrm 
H2FC 
PV-onsite 
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Aggregation of various types of traditional (single steam cycle) coal power plants without FGD and DEN OX 
Aggregation of various types of traditional (single steam cycle) coal power plants with FGD up to 90 percent and DEN OX 
up to 50 percent 
Integrated (coal) gasification combined cycle with 99 percent FGD and DENOX. Some potential for co-generation 
Aggregation of various types of oil power plants (includes e.g. Rrankine cycle with low NOx emissions and 90 percent 
DENOX, but also light oil fueled engine plants). Some potential for co-generation 
Standard natural gas power plant (rRankine cycle) with district heat co-generation 
Natural gas combined cycle power plant including some potential for co-generation 
Natural gas combined cycle power plant with zero carbon emissions C02 is assumed to be re-injected in gas or oil fields 
(e.g. for enhanced recovery). Efficiency loss due to re-injection (compared to GCC) about 1 percent 
Coal- and gas-based high-temperature fuel cell. It is assumed in most of the scenarios that this technology will be available 
commercially after 2010 
Standard municipal waste power plant (rRankine cycle) with 90 percent FGD and 50 percent DENOX 
Biomass power plant (single steam cycle) with some potential for district heat co-generation 
Biomass gasification power plant · 
Low-cost conventional nuclear power plant (light and heavy water reactor) 
High-cost conventional nuclear power plant (light and heavy water reactor) 
Aggregation of various types of advanced nuclear power plants including high-temperature and fast breeder reactors with 
some potential for district heat and hydrogen co-generation 
Aggregation of various types of hydroelectric power plants. Low- and high-cost plants are distinguished in all scenarios 
in order to reflect the influence of different sites and other factors on the plant costs 
Solar thermal power plant with storage and some potential for district heat and hydrogen co-generation 
Solar photovoltaic power generation excluding onsite electricity production (predominantly large-scale power plants) 
Wind turbine power plant 
Geothermal power plant 
Aggregation of types of hydrogen fuel cells for industrial and residential use with some potential for district heat 
co-generation 
Photovoltaic onsite electricity production 
ability of "leap-frogging" [41]. That is, avoiding the 
development of large-scale fossil-based energy systems and 
associated long-lived infrastructures and moving directly 
to new, cleaner and more efficient energy technologies and 
infrastructures. Such a "leap-frogging" process, however, 
will require substantial efforts and a radical departure from 
"business-as-usual" trajectories and policies. 
changes to the current energy markets and standard busi-
ness practices. In particular, the emergence of fuel cells and 
other distributed energy alternatives could alter fundamen-
tally the structure of the power generation and transportation 
business, driving to the creation of new products and val-
ues, service standards, innovative business partnerships, etc. 
Fuel cells have significant potential to become an important 
element of the portfolio of options to meet ever-increasing 
demands for energy services while responding to more strin-
gent reliability and power quality standards, mounting envi-
ronmental constraints, cost-effectiveness pressures and other 
challenges that energy systems will face in the future. How-
ever, their successful diffusion requires a coordinated strat-
egy in different market segments, which could allow tapping 
potential synergies and benefiting from cost reductions re-
sulting from economies-of-volume and technological learn-
ing processes [33]. 
The primary-energy mix of this "hydrogen economy" 
decarbonizes at a fast pace. This trend is combined with 
substantial improvements of energy intensity resulting in 
considerable reductions of GHG emissions and, conse-
quently, in relatively low climate change impacts. Still, 
the path followed in the Bl-H2 world may not be enough 
to protect against high climate sensitivities and additional 
actions may be required. Hydrogen production, however, 
enables the capture and subsequent sequestration of car-
bon and, thus, opens new possibilities. This highlights the 
key role that hydrogen could play to "hedge" against the 
risks of uncertain climate change. Pursuing the penetration 
of hydrogen within the current hydrocarbon-based energy 
system, while being compatible with the dominant tech-
nological regime, could pave the way for the long-term 
transition to an energy system with low release of carbon 
to the atmosphere. 
The unfolding of a sustainable hydrogen-based energy 
system such as the one portrayed here could bring profound 
Clearly, a number of technological, institutional, po-
litical and social hurdles stay in the way of a transition 
toward a sustainable hydrogen-based global energy system. 
Achieving the large-scale transformations that would result 
in a clean and sustainable hydrogen-based energy future 
requires substantial efforts in a number of fields and the 
involvement of many different social actors. In particular, 
the combination of government measures and business ac-
tions is necessary to stimulate the growth of a sustainable 
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hydrogen energy industry, the commercialization of the 
technologies and the development of a supporting infras-
tructure [33]. Among other actors, current energy supply 
companies could become prime players in the transition, if 
they recognize the challenges and are able to harness the 
opportunities that hydrogen-based technologies bring with 
them. 
Together with other activities, international partnerships 
on research, development, demonstration and deployment 
(RD3, [5]) are necessary for a successful development 
of hydrogen technologies and their introduction into the 
marketplace. International public-private collaboration on 
RD3 would contribute to share costs and risks of R& D 
and demonstration projects, identify and exploit niche mar-
ket opportunities and implement buy-down strategies to 
ensure that these technologies will move along their learn-
ing curves. They could also facilitate technology transfer 
and access to attractive markets, key issues for speeding 
up the global deployment of a cluster of cleaner and more 
efficient hydrogen-based technologies. 
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Aggregate technologies in the electricity generation sector 
are given in Table 2 
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